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ABSTRACT
In this paper we are going to characterize the idea of logical pluralism according to Beall 
and Restall. In order to do that, this paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, 
we shall define briefly what Beall and Restall’s theory is about. In the second, we shall deal 
with some problems with the theory and some possible answers. Finally, three objections 
will be raised.
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RESUMO
Neste artigo caracterizamos a ideia de pluralismo lógico de acordo com Beall e Restall. 
Para fazer isso, este artigo é dividido em três seções. Na primeira seção, definiremos breve-
mente o que é a teoria de Beall e Restall. Na segunda, trataremos de alguns problemas da 
teoria e algumas possíveis respostas. Finalmente, três objecções serão apontadas.
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I
Logical pluralism is the thesis that there are at least two logics that are equally valid. But this 
could be understood in different ways. There are ways in which it is evident that there is plural-
ism. In contrast, there are other ways that are more questionable. It is unquestionable that the 
twentieth century has brought us many different logics: intuitionistic logic, relevant logic, many 
valued logics, etc. In this sense, it is obvious that there is a plurality of logics. But as Priest (2006, 
p. 195) argues, logical pluralism acquires significance and interest when we talk about the appli-
cations of such logics in a  ecific domain. In that case, pure logics, mathematical logic systems, 
become theories of that domain. In such a way, logics acquire the status of scientific theories and 
the problem of whether or not there is more than one valid logic for a certain domain turns into 
an important issue. Later we will see why this is interesting.
The version of logical pluralism that we are going to discuss here is that stated by Beall 
and Re all in “Logical Pluralism” (2000). According to them, there are at least two ways to un-
derstand deductive validity and these two ways are equally good (Beall and Re all, 2001, §1). 
Their pluralism is a pluralism about logical consequence. The main idea is that there are different 
formal ways to understand the pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence, (V), according to 
which a conclusion, A, follows from premises Σ, if and only if any case in which each premise in 
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Σ is true is also a case in which A is true (Beall and Re all, 
2000, p. 476). As there are at least two precisifications of such 
cases, there are at least two equally valid logics. One type of 
case could be a Tarskian first-order interpretation; another 
could be a possible situation, or an inconsistent or incomplete 
interpretation.
II
At this point, let’s analyse some objections that have 
been raised to this theory. A first objection argues that log-
ical pluralism is an empty position since there are not many 
logicians that would adopt it. For instance, the law of the 
excluded middle is necessary for the classic logician, but it is 
not for the intuitionistjust as ex falso quodlibet is valid for 
both of them, but it is rejected by the relevantist. As all of 
them believe in their own notion of logical consequence, none 
would adopt a logical pluralism. Hence, we could conclude, 
logical pluralism is a position that would be maintained by 
few logicians. Beall and Re all (2006, p. 87-88) answer this 
objection by arguing that this fact is not surprising. The rea-
son why it is not surprising is because most intuitionists, rel-
evantists, etc. are monists and consider their own logic as the 
only valid form. However, this a ect is not a necessary and 
essential feature of their theories. It could be said that rele-
vantists develop their logic because they deny the classical 
notion of logical consequence, but as the authors claim, this 
is not necessary. One could develop a relevant logic with the 
motivation of formalising that other notion of logical conse-
quence according to which the premises must be relevant for 
the conclusion. Assuming and accepting this, there are thus 
other ways to understand it.
Another objection refers to our logical preferences. The 
objection says that if we prefer a particular logic, we are not 
actually defending a logical pluralism (Beall and Re all, 2006, 
p. 99). Beall and Re all reply that logical pluralism is not in-
consistent with the idea of having favourite logics. Their va-
lidity has nothing to do with individual preferences. This is 
why, since both logics are products of different ways of under-
standing the pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence, 
we keep on being pluralists.
Russell (2013) argues that we can deduce two things 
from Beall and Re all’s theses: (i) the meaning of the term 
‘case’ is undefined; (ii) as it is undefined, we could find more 
than one precisification, which would make us pluralists. 
However, according to the author, none of them is unavoid-
able. As for the first thesis, Russell maintain that philosophy 
of language has showed us that we could find an approach that 
captures exactly what we mean by the notion of logical conse-
quence. One possible way, she suggests, could be making use of 
mathematical techniques. But this seems unsatisfactory. It is 
not clear how the concept of ‘case’ or ‘logical consequence’ in 
general could be analysed (even less with mathematical tools) 
for it to reach a completely defined meaning. The vagueness 
of the term and its possible interpretations happen to be a 
part of its meaning. Otherwise, we will have an artificial con-
cept that is unlikely to reflect our pre-theoretical notion. 
As for the second case, the author argues that even as-
suming that the term is indefinite, this does not necessarily 
mean that we are going to find more than one precisification 
of ‘cases’. This objection may be valid in general, but it is not 
valid in this case, since Beall and Re all have already offered 
three such possible  ecifications.
The last objection begins by noting that in the principle 
(V) there is a universal quantifier. Regardless of the precisifi-
cations of cases, the conclusion must follow from all of them. 
So the true logic would be the intersection of all systems ac-
cepted by (V). Beall and Re all (2006, p. 92) answer this ob-
jection by saying that the only inference that would really sur-
vive the intersection is the law of identity. If A, then A. And 
it seems that to conclude that the law of identity is the only 
valid argument is somewhat implausible and demotivating.
Priest argues that this might be the case for pure log-
ics, but it seems unlikely when we talk about applied logics, 
particularly in the canonical application of logic: the analysis 
of human reasoning. Priest thus provides an example of an 
inference that would not fail in any case: “For example, any 
situation in which a conjunction holds, the conjunction holds, 
simply in virtue of the meaning of ^. […] As long as meanings 
are fixed, one can’t vary them to dispose of valid inferences” 
(2006, p. 203). However, there are reasons to think like Beall 
and Re all in this re ect. Inferences are valid thanks to the 
meaning that has been assigned to the connective from each 
precisification of (V). In this manner, an intuitionist denies 
the law of the excluded middle by virtue of the meaning of the 
connectives ¬ and v. And for this reason it seems implausible 
that his example may count as a valid inference for any logic. 
A similar response is offered by Russell (2013).
III
Finally, we will outline three objections. The first con-
sists in defending the idea that Beall and Re all actually 
discuss theoretical pluralism, not applied pluralism. In this 
sense, it would not be an interesting pluralism. The second 
objection would consist in pointing out that, even assum-
ing that the position defended by Beall and Re all was an 
applied pluralism, the canonical application of logic is inac-
curate. At this point we will attempt to distinguish between 
different domains of reasoning and defend the implausi-
bility of a logical pluralism in them. A third objection, in-
dependent of the other two and hypothetical, would be to 
argue that the theoretical pluralism (not applied pluralism) 
defended by Beall and Re all is compatible with (and under 
some interpretations leads to) logical monism.
Let’s start with the first objection. What Beall and Re-
stall argue is that there are different, equally acceptable ways 
to understand and theorize the pre-theoretical notion of log-
ical consequence. This therefore leads us to accept other for-
mal systems. But this kind of pluralism would be a non-inter-
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esting pluralism because it simply creates different logics from 
different precisifications of cases. What we are e ablishing 
are pure logics, in the sense described by Graham Priest.
Thus, we have an immense number of pure logics (classi-
cal logic, modal logics: S4, S5, T, etc.), chara erised as well-de-
fined mathematical structures. Then we would have a subset 
of such logics consisting of those that adequately chara erize 
our pre-theoretical notion of logical consequenceat least 
three: classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and logic of relevance. 
To talk about a pluralism of this kind would simply mean that 
such logics are mathematical structures with the property of 
fitting with our pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence. 
This is indisputable but not interesting.
Someone might object that Beall and Re all do not ac-
tually advocate for a theoretical pluralism, but for an applied 
pluralism. In this way, one could argue that as this is a plu-
ralism about the notion of logical consequence, it has been 
already  ecified that its scope is the analysis of human rea-
soning. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think otherwise, 
namely that Beall and Re all maintain a purely theoretical 
pluralism. Here we can find proof. In Chapter 8 of Logical 
Pluralism (2006) the authors address some objections to their 
theory, including the following.
What logic is the logical pluralist using when defending 
his theory? Like every reasoning, logical pluralism is argued fol-
lowing inference patterns. What then is the logic behind the 
pluralistic reasoning? According to the objection, this will lead 
to logical monism. The response of the authors is as follows:
As anyone who applies formal logics knows, 
the fit between deductive validity and anal-
ysis of actual reasoning is not always an easy 
one. […] The pluralist claim is that, given a 
body of informal reasoning […], you can use 
different consequence relations in order to 
analyse the reasoning. As to which relation 
we wish our own reasoning to be evalu-
ated by, we are happy to say: any and all 
(admissible) ones! Our arguments might be 
valid by some and invalid by others, good 
in some senses and bad in others (Beall and 
Restall, 2006, p. 99).
We can tell from the first sentence that deductive valid-
ity does not exactly fit with the analysis of the actual reason-
ing. In addition, in their theory they  eak of deductive valid-
ity. Therefore, we can conclude that their logical pluralism is 
a purely theoretical pluralism.
But let’s suppose that Beall and Re all talk about applied 
pluralism. In that case, we would pass to the second objection: 
the one of the various areas of application. The scope of ap-
plication, we remember, is the canonical analysis of human 
reasoning (Priest, 2006, p. 196). A pluralist position on this 
application (following the tenets of Beall and Re all) would 
say that at least two precisifications of cases are compatible 
with our notion of logical consequence, and would be equally 
valid in order to analyse human reasoning.
As a matter of fact, there is a variety of types of dis-
course, and in order to formalize them, we need different log-
ics, focusing on the  ecial features of each type of discourse. 
For instance, modal logic is more appropriate than classical 
logic in order to  eak of necessity and possibility. And clas-
sical logic may be more appropriate than logic of relevance in 
certain situations. For instance, it seems that the principle of 
explosion is used in our ordinary language. It does not seem 
absurd to say that if a contradiction is true, then we can con-
clude anything. “What do you mean? If it is true that you 
were in Barcelona and in Madrid at the same time, then I am 
a Martian”. What this is trying to show is that the way we un-
derstand the canonical application of logic is wrong and that 
human reasoning cannot be understood as a single field. In-
stead, we need to  ecify the types of  eech that are in it. The 
canonical application should not be understood as the analysis 
of reasoning in order to see if a conclusion, A, follows from a 
set of premises, Σ. What we must take into account is that the 
content of these premises and their context is relevant to see 
what logic we should use. Therefore, the main claim at this 
point is that there is no canonical application, namely, human 
reasoning, but there are many applications depending on the 
content of the discourse that we are treating.
Thus, different discourses may require different logics. 
For instance, modal discourse would require a different logi-
cal analysis to temporal discourse. In this sense, it is clear that 
there is a plurality of equally valid logics, since they simply 
try to analyse different areas of application. However, this 
would not be an interesting but an obvious pluralism. We can 
remind ourselves of Beall and Re all at this point. They re-
marked that their arguments could be valid in one logic but 
invalid according to another. They argue that the logic that 
we should apply will depend on the type of verification we 
need for the task we are performing2.
Instead, a type of logical pluralism that might be inter-
esting, as we anticipated at the beginning, would follow if in 
a particular type of  eech there was more than one equally 
valid logic. For example, focusing on necessity and possibility, 
we might ask whether there is more than one equally valid 
modal logic. As Priest (2006, p. 195) says, in its scope, logic 
is no longer a pure mathematical structure that does not talk 
about the world as an explanatory theory of its field. Howev-
er, it seems implausible that we could be talking about logical 
pluralism when we talk about enclosed fields of reasoning, 
since we understand this logic as an empirical theory that at-
tempts to account for a universe of discourse. In this way, as 
in other sciences, we do not accept various theories as valid in 
the same sense. We try to see which one is the best under dif-
2 “It depends, of course, on whether the given kind of verification preservation is important to the task at hand. […] perhaps the classical 
invalidity is merely an artefact of the expressive weakness of classical first-order logic” (Beall and Restall, 2000, p. 99-100).
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ferent criteria (for its simplicity, its lack of ad hoc postulates, 
etc.). For instance, in the realm of necessity and contingency, 
a modal theory will be the best theory that fits in that par-
ticular realm. Ties could be possible, but momentary. In the 
end, for one criteria or another, we would end up choosing 
one theory (logic) over another.
Finally, we shall turn to the third objection. Here we 
will focus on the possibility of understanding the relation 
of logical consequence as we could understand negation or 
conditional if our language use was ambiguous. If our use of 
negation is ambiguous such that, for instance, sometimes we 
use it with the meaning of classical negation and other times 
with the meaning of the intuitionistic negation, then we actu-
ally have two legitimate meanings of negation that therefore 
should be treated differently. We should have two signs in for-
mal language to represent both meanings, as we have different 
symbols for the conditional depending on its truth conditions.




p |- p, meaning ¬
1
 as the intuitionis-




p |- p, 
meaning ¬
2
 as the classical negation, would be a valid infer-
ence. As we can see, we are not changing between logics and 
arguing that in classical logic stating that ¬¬p |- p is a valid 
inference while in intuitionistic logic it is not. We are just 
treating two connectives with different truth conditions in a 
different way within the same logic (Priest, 2006, p. 198-199).
Now, we have two possibilities: either our pre-theoreti-
cal notion of logical consequence relation is ambiguous, or it 
is not. If not, then we would conclude that there is only one 
way to understand it, one precisification of cases; therefore, 
we would maintain logical monism. However, if it is ambigu-
ous, then this notion could be instantiated in different ways. 
An example of this is offered by Beall and Re all.
Nevertheless, another possible way of putting this ambi-
guity is the following. If there is more than one precisification 
of cases, because of the ambiguity of the notion of logical con-
sequence, then we can keep both the truth of, for example,  |-
1
 
p v ¬ p, and the falsity of |-
2
 p v ¬ p, meaning |-
1
 as the relation 
of logical consequence maintained by classical logicians, and 
|-
2
 as the relation of logical consequence maintained by intu-
itionist logicians. Since there is no single way of understanding 
the relation of logical consequence, we should act in the same 
way as with conditional or negation and e ablish that there 
are at least two types, with their own logical symbols. Thus, 
we are not saying that p ^ ¬ p is valid and invalid at the same 
time,3 but that it is valid for a type of logical consequence and 
invalid for another.
What, then, is the difference from the logical pluralism 
developed by Beall and Re all? Beall and Re all’s logical 
pluralism assumes the ambiguity of the notion of logical con-
sequence, but solves it by validating different and mutually 
incompatible logics. According to the hypothesis given above, 
it would be possible to create a new logic that, providing dif-
ferent signs for different ways of understanding this concept, 
could be a consistent theory. 
However, we should not conclude that all kinds of log-
ical pluralism could entail monism. This objection works 
against the idea of a  pluralism based on the breadth of possi-
bilities that arise from a pre-theoretical conception of logical 
consequence. Thus, there could be other ways of understand-
ing logical pluralism.
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3 It is useful to remember the law of noncontradiction as it was stated by Aristotle: nothing can both exist and not exist at the same time 
and in the same respect.
